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Israel expects post-virus wave of Jewish immigration | Daily Sabah – Daily Sabah

Posted By on June 19, 2020

Like thousands of other French Jews, Dan Bocobza had for years been contemplating aliyah, or immigration to Israel, but when coronavirus hit France, he decided to make his move.

"France's mismanagement of COVID-19 played a role, but above all it was feeling that suddenly the doors were closed," said Bocobza, an entrepreneur and father-of-seven.

In France, a country of 65 million, the virus has claimed over 29,000 lives, with the Jewish community particularly hard hit, according to officials in local organizations.

Israel, with a population of 9 million, has managed to largely stem the spread of the virus, with just over 300 fatalities a death ratio 13 times lower.

Now Israel expects that the global health crisis will bring in its wake a wave of "post-coronavirus" immigration, once the Jewish state reopens its borders to nonresidents.

"By the end of 2021, we can expect the arrival of 90,000 immigrants, compared to the 35,463 of 2019," Immigration Minister Pnina Tamano-Shata told parliament Wednesday.

All Jews, as well as children and even grandchildren of Jews, are entitled under Israel's "law of return" to automatically receive citizenship if they immigrate to Israel.

Many Jews around the world have long felt that Israel would always be a sanctuary if things at home went bad.

Some have moved because of anti-Semitism or economic crises, others because of their religious or Zionist ideologies.

But now the sudden realization they would not always be able to enter Israel as non-citizens have pushed some to opt for aliyah.

"We always considered leaving for Israel, but the crisis created a new situation of not being able to travel," Bocobza said by telephone from France.

"That was a real blow to me."

Corona vs. attacks

Israeli officials dealing with aliyah met Tuesday at the Knesset, Israel's parliament, and demanded larger budgets ahead of the expected wave.

Even "before the crisis, we did not have enough money and now we have more and more requests to open files," said Neta Briskin-Peleg, head of Nativ, the state organization tasked with examining immigration requests from the former Soviet Union.

Shay Felber of the Jewish Agency, the quasi-governmental organization that encourages immigration to Israel, said that since the pandemic broke out, there have been "three times the number of requests for aliyah from France."

Some 700 immigration files were opened in May 2020 at the Jewish Agency's offices in France, compared to 130 in May 2019.

A record 7,900 requests were filed in 2015, the year when a string of attacks in and around Paris killed a total of 146 people, among them four hostages at a Jewish supermarket.

The deadliest attack claimed 130 lives in bombings and shootings at Paris's Bataclan concert hall, several bars and restaurants, and at the Stade de France sports stadium.

"The effects of the coronavirus will certainly be more powerful on the Jews of France than those of the 2015 attacks," said Ariel Kandel, director of Qualita, an organization helping to integrate French and Francophone Jews in Israeli society.

'Testing times'

The U.S. is home to the world's largest Jewish community outside of Israel.

Ronen Foxman of Nefesh Benefesh, an organization that deals with aliyah from North America and Britain, reported at the Tuesday Knesset meeting a rise of up to 400% in aliyah requests in recent months.

But he said obstacles remained for potential immigrants. For one, some U.S. professional qualifications are not recognized in Israel.

"We must ease the process of professional recognition, which would cost nothing but constitute substantial help to aliyah candidates," Kandel of Qualita told AFP.

"Many people from France expressing interest in immigration need help in three areas: employment, education and housing," he said.

Without a state budget to deal with those issues, he said, "those people won't be able to come."

In the economic crisis caused by the pandemic, the Israeli government must soon approve its annual budget.

"We must tell the diaspora Jews we are with them in these testing times, when communities are in duress due to the coronavirus," Diaspora Minister Omer Yankelevitch told the Knesset on Monday.

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Israel expects post-virus wave of Jewish immigration | Daily Sabah - Daily Sabah

The Unfinished Project of Enlightenment – Boston Review

Posted By on June 19, 2020

Frontispiece to the 1772 edition of the Encyclopdie by Diderot and d'Alembert. At the center, crowned Reason attempts to remove the veil from Truth. Image: Wikimedia Commons

In a sweeping new history of Western philosophy,Jrgen Habermas narrates the progess of humanity through the unfolding of public reason. Missing from that story are the systems of violence and dispossession whose legacies are all too visible today.

Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie (This Too a History of Philosophy)Vol. 1, Die okzidentale Konstellation von Glauben und Wissen (The Occidental Constellation of Faith and Knowledge)Vol. 2, Vernnftige Freiheit. Spuren des Diskurses ber Glauben und Wissen (Rational Liberty: Traces of the Discourse on Faith and Knowledge)Jrgen HabermasSuhrkamp Verlag, 98 (cloth)

No one in the world feels the weakness of general characterizing more than I. So lamented Johann Gottfried von Herder, towering figure of the German Enlightenment, in his 1774 treatise This Too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity. One draws together peoples and periods of time that follow one another in an eternal succession like waves of the sea, Herder wrote. Whom has one painted? Whom has the depicting word captured? For Herder, the Enlightenment dream of grasping human history as a seamless whole came up against the irreducible particularity of individuals and cultures.

At a time of crisis, Habermas suggests that humanity already possesses the resources for levelheaded debate oriented toward the common good.

The German philosopher and social theorist Jrgen Habermas, among the most influential thinkers of our time, grapples with much the same problem in his new work, the title of which reverses the order of Herders terms: This Too a History of Philosophy. Published in German last September, Habermass History spans over 3,000 years and 1,700 pages. It marks the apogee of a singular career. Like his eighteenth-century precursor, Habermas seeks a thoroughgoing reconceptualization of the sweep of human history. Philosophical problems, he writes, are distinctive from merely scientific ones in their synthetic force. For Habermas, the fragmentation of modern life has hardly exhausted philosophys capacity for bold questions and architectonic structure.

To be sure, the work pays homage to the legacy of postmodern critique. Wary of Herders pitfalls of general characterizing, Habermas eschews airy speculation for dense textual reconstruction. But this history of philosophy, no less than Enlightenment philosophies of history, is driven by a teleological intent, a principle that threads through historys seeming randomness and contingency. For Herder, that principle was humanitys formation (Bildung), a foundational concept of the German Enlightenment linking the moral development of the individual with the progress of civilization. For Habermas, it is instead a collective learning process (Lernprozess). History, in Habermass telling, is the story of humanitys learning, a record of problems solved and challenges overcome. New knowledge about the objective world alongside social crises, he explains, create cognitive dissonances. These dissonances propel societies to adopt novel modes of understanding and interaction.

The vehicle of Habermass learning process is language: the source of human rationality, the storehouse of humanitys accumulated knowledge, and the medium by which that knowledge can be challenged and improved. Here too Habermas plays variations on an Enlightenment theme. But there is a catch. Although immersed in the give and take of rational argument, Habermass protagonists develop metaphysical systems that obscure their own intersubjective meaning-making. For Habermas, only with the rise of modern, postmetaphysical thinking does philosophy become conscious of the learning process itself.

Tracing a continuous learning process across three millennia of Western philosophy, This Too a History of Philosophy is a masterpiece of erudition and synthesis. Habermass command of the philosophical canon astounds, and even experts will find fresh insight in his searching portraits. At the same time, his narrative of humanitys rational development invites us to pose Herders challenge anew: Whom has Habermass History captured? Most urgent is the questionraised, but not resolvedof how the learning process traversed by the West interacts with wider histories of the modern world.

Born in 1929 into Western Germanys Protestant middle class, Habermas is contemporary Europes most prominent philosopher and public intellectual. Over a prodigious career stretching nearly seven decades, he has set out a system linking epistemology, linguistics, sociology, politics, religion, and law. His philosophical texts have appeared in over forty languages. But more than that, Habermas has distinguished himself as a staunch advocate of the intellectuals public role. His exchanges with interlocutors from John Rawls to Michel Foucault have generated debate across the humanities, and his political interventions have shaped controversies on themes from historical memory to European unification to genetic engineering.

Habermass ninetieth birthday last year initiated spirited discussions of his lifes work. His lecture marking the occasion at the University of Frankfurt drew a crowd of over 3,000 listeners, while the appearance of the eight-hundred-page Cambridge Habermas Lexicon set the stage for the next phase of his reception in English. More controversially, a polemic by the political philosopher Raymond Geuss challenged the very foundations of Habermass thought and sparked a contentious exchange among scholars of critical theory. Habermas turns ninety-one today, remaining no less active and continuing to inspire and provoke.

Democracy, for Habermas, is a system where uncoerced communication triumphs over naked power, where rational argument among equal citizens forms the basis of political legitimacy.

An overarching project connects Habermass philosophical writing with his public advocacy and helps to account for his global reach: the elaboration of what he terms a theory of communicative rationality. When we address ourselves to another human being through language, Habermas argues, we assume the possibility of mutual intelligibility and rational persuasion. In an ideal speech situation, where no coercion is present save the unforced force of the better argument, dialogue would foster consensus based on rational agreement. Habermas recognizes that most communication is far from this ideal. Yet he insists that the ideal remains the prerequisite even for ordinary speech, and contains the seedbed of radical democracy. Democracy, for Habermas, is a system where uncoerced communication triumphs over naked power, where rational argument among equal citizens forms the basis of political legitimacy.

Habermass project emerged from the traumas of postwar Germany. Fifteen-years-old at the time of the Nazi collapse, Habermas had narrowly escaped military conscription and listened, horrified, to radio broadcasts of the Nuremberg trials. Determined to uncover where German history had gone so wrong, and whether German culture possessed resources for the countrys reconstruction, the Gymnasium student abandoned a planned career in medicine to pursue philosophy. In what has become a set piece of his biography, it was the 1953 republication of a Nazi-era tract by the philosopher Martin Heidegger, extolling the inner truth and greatness of National Socialism, that led the young Habermas to reject the reigning existentialism and cultural despair. He would instead find his academic home at the University of Frankfurt, among the returned German-Jewish exiles Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. Their reconstituted Institute for Social Research served as a haven for critical debate amidst postwar West Germanys hidebound academic culture.

Yet even as he quickly gained recognition as the leader of the Frankfurt Schools second generation, Habermas diverged from his predecessors. Whereas Horkheimer and Adornos Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947) tracked the decay of Western rationalism into a self-destructive instrumental reason, Habermas sought out a mode of rationality that escaped a narrow means-ends logic. This he would locate in intersubjective communication. Habermass habilitation thesis and the book that made his name, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962), foreshadowed the centrality of communication for his lifes work. Embedding philosophical argument in historical sociology, Habermas traced the rise of a bourgeois public sphere in the coffee houses and print culture of eighteenth-century Europe. The new domain of reasoned deliberation, between the official institutions of politics and the private sphere of the family, challenged ruling authorities and fomented the spread of republican ideas. Although Structural Transformation concluded by charting the decline of the public sphere in modern mass mediaa pervasive concern in todays talk of disinformation and fake newsthe work announced its authors lifelong identification with the unfinished project of Enlightenment.

If Structural Transformation made Habermas a rising star, it was his 1981 magnum opus, The Theory of Communicative Action, that established him as a premier philosopher of the twentieth century. Theory bore the fruits of two decades of intellectual exploration, including a stint as director of the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, Bavaria, and an ambitious program of reading across classical sociology, systems theory, ordinary language philosophy, and American pragmatism. The book marshaled all of these influences to uncover the rational foundations of communication as a path toward reenergizing democracy. The modern system of economy and bureaucracy, Habermas concluded, must be subjected to rigorous oversight by the lifeworld, the spaces of society and culture where free communication can flourish. While accepting the structures of the capitalist welfare state, Habermas warned against the colonization of the lifeworld by private interests. He would return to this theme over subsequent political writings.

When we address ourselves to another human being through language, Habermas argues, we assume the possibility of mutual intelligibility and rational persuasion. He recognizes that most communication is far from this ideal.

This Too a History of Philosophy marks the culmination of a third stage of Habermass career, one in which questions of faith and religion have assumed increasing prominence. Habermass earlier work hinged on a theory of secularization. Whatever ones private convictions, the public sphere depended on the exchange of validity claims accessible to all citizens; appeals to faith had to be checked at the door. Yet in an address one month after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Habermas characterized contemporary Western democracies as postsecular societies. The public sphere, he now argued, should accommodate religious diversity and permit the participation of religious citizens. Habermas went further in a 2005 essay that followed a public discussion with Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (later Pope Benedict XVI). Not only should religious and secular citizens have equal access to the public sphere, but the latter can be reasonably expected not to exclude the possibility that [religious] contributions may have cognitive substance.

For some of Habermass secular-minded interlocutors, these apparent concessions to religion betrayed the rational promise of critical social theory. Yet as with so much in Habermas, what seems an about-face reflects a deepening of earlier concerns. My own research on Protestant intellectual networks in early postwar Germany uncovered evidence of Habermass participation in Christian-Marxist working groups during the early 1960s. And since the 1980s, Habermas has engaged in philosophical exchanges with prominent Christian theologians, most notably his Catholic contemporary Johann Baptist Metz. Habermass recent writings build upon his longstanding view that religious citizens can contribute moral insight to the public sphereand that they did so in a democratizing Germany. As Europe absorbs new waves of Muslim immigrants, Habermas has sought to combat xenophobic discourses of cultural difference, while fostering democratic deliberation across religious divides.

But more provocative convictions drive Habermass writings on religion as well. Notwithstanding his advocacy for a religiously plural public sphere, Habermas has remained emphatic about the foundational role of Western Christianity. Already in The Theory of Communicative Action, he drew on the classical sociologist Max Weber to trace the rise of modern purposive rationality out of the Protestant idea of vocation. More recently, Habermas has distanced himself from claims of Weberian disenchantment to suggest that the process of secularization remains incomplete. Universalistic egalitarianism, he stated in a 2002 interview, is the direct legacy of the Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of love . . . Up to this very day there is no alternative to it. Drawing a dubious contrast between the two monotheistic religions, Habermas articulated what would become the core of his intellectual program. The Wests Judeo-Christian heritage was not a passing phase in the emergence of modern thought and politics, but contributedand perhaps still contributesits essential core.

This Too a History of Philosophy is the realization of Habermass claim on a grand scale. At its most basic, the work provides a historical survey linking Habermass longstanding theory of communication with his more recent argument for the preeminence of Judeo-Christianity. The central thesis is expansive but straightforward. Communicative rationality as well as constitutional democracy emerged out of a three-thousand-year dialogue between the two poles of Western thought: faith and knowledge. Through a protracted history of intellectual debate and social transformation, the moral universalism at the core of Christianityhaving evolved out of its Jewish precursorwas subsumed into modern, postmetaphysical thinking. Habermass account of secularization departs from what the philosopher Charles Taylor has termed the subtraction story, by which irrational beliefs are stripped away with the forward march of science. Instead, Habermas reconstructs the interactions of Christian faith and worldly knowledge as a process not of conflict, but of mutual learning and translation.

Habermass learning process is rooted in the very nature of Homo sapiens as a linguistic being. Drawing on the research of the developmental psychologist Michael Tomasello, he begins with a sharp distinction between human and animal cognition. Other primates, Habermas explains, communicate to indicate objects in their own environments. But the unique social complexity of human life, manifested in the monogamous family and paleolithic hunt, catalyzed a distinctive ability to communicate intersubjectively about a shared objective world. This unique form of language allowed human beings to formulate collective solutions to common problems. Humanitys social and cultural learning could thereby outpace its biological evolution.

The Wests Judeo-Christian heritage was not a passing phase in the emergence of modern thought and politics, Habermas argues, but contributedand perhaps still contributesits essential core.

Habermas proceeds to narrate the early development of human societies along a hierarchy of communicative forms. Ritual served as the primordial medium of symbolic communication, bridging the individual and the collective. Habermas locates a shift to myth in the Near Eastern high cultures of the third millennium B.C.E., characterized by written language, scientific advancement, and political hierarchy. But the crucial transformation came in the Axial Age of Moses, Buddha, Confucius, and Platoa term Habermas borrows from the philosopher Karl Jaspers. Whereas myth collapsed god and man into one another, the Axial worldviews accomplished the seminal distinction between sacred and profane, eternal and temporal. In Judaisms omniscient God, Buddhisms doctrine of reincarnation, and Platos Forms, Habermas locates the foundations for the transcendental perspective of both objective science and universal morality.

Jaspers developed the concept of the Axial Age, Habermas notes, to overcome the Eurocentric narrowing of view to the Western path of cultural development. But Habermass own study takes a sharp turn toward the West. It is the particular history of Western Christianity, he argues, that leads from the nascent universalism of the Axial Age to modern postmetaphysical reason and constitutional democracy. Eastern religions became amalgamated to state power or declined in competition with new sciences. Judaism remained too bound to its sacral language and text to interact productively with its surroundings. But the unique circumstances of early Christianitys confrontation with Greek philosophy and Roman state power catalyzed a process of mutual learning. The cross-pollination of faith and knowledge found an early apex in Augustines fourth-century synthesis of Christianity and Platonism. And at the same time that Augustine introduced philosophy to the Church, Western Christianitys Roman-inspired legal system brought the Church into the realm of power politics.

Traversing the church-state conflicts of medieval Europe, Habermas arrives at thirteenth-century Italy as a new turning point: a site at which the earliest forms of proto-capitalism inaugurated the functional differentiation of modern society. Thomas Aquinas, the central thinker of the period, departed from Augustines Christian-Platonist synthesis to establish theology and philosophy as separate disciplines. Reason and faith now offered firmly independent paths toward salvation. Though Aquinas remained a monarchist, his formulation of natural law, implanted by God in human reason, opened the door to nascent democratic theories. With unprecedented criticisms of the pope, Aquinass late medieval successors theorized law as a limit on both church and state power. They prefigured an age when law would become an object of contestation among citizens.

Yet ironically, perhaps reflective of Webers ongoing influence, it is the political reactionary Martin Luther who is accorded pride of place in Habermass narrative of secularization. Luthers attack on ecclesiastical authority, Habermas argues, not only exacerbated the cleft of church and state, but located faith in the intersubjective exchange between the human being and God. Protestant hermeneutics, in which every believer became an interpreter of Scripture, foreshadowed a communicative rationality in which authority is accorded to the most convincing argument.

Habermas reconstructs the interactions of Christian faith and worldly knowledge as a process not of conflict, but of mutual learning and translation.

At the same time, Luthers attempt to secure faith from the incursions of worldly authority set up its own undoing. The Reformation, in addition to the scientific and political revolutions of the seventeenth century, tore apart the Augustinian and Thomist syntheses of ontology (what is there?) with practical philosophy (what should I do?). The secularization of state power, epitomized in the English constitutional revolution, eroded the Christian foundations of political order; the determinism of Newtonian laws threatened to undermine human free will, the kernel of Christian morality. The question of legitimacy emerged as the Achilles heel of modern thought.

David Hume and Immanuel Kant are the eighteenth-century thinkers who, for Habermas, articulated the paradigm-shifting responses to this problem. Seventeenth-century philosophers could reconcile faith and knowledge only at the expense of inconsistent foundations: consider Thomas Hobbess argument for religiously based monarchy despite his avowed atheism and John Lockes return to divinely ordained natural law. Only in Hume and Kant was the breakthrough to postmetaphysical thinking achieved. Hume disaggregated human subjectivity into a succession of sense-impressions, dissolving Christian metaphysics. But Kant emerges as the hero of Habermass narrative, the figure who reconstructed the rational core of Christianity in the wake of Humes withering critique. Kants categorical imperative, which called on individuals to posit their actions as the basis for a universal law, established a universal morality on purely rational grounds.

Habermas presents the history of post-Kantian philosophy as a short path toward his own theory of communicative action. The key challenge was to ground the concept of rational libertywhich Kant defined as the subjects obedience to a self-willed lawin an account of society. G. F. W. Hegel, building on Herders turn to history and culture, identified reason with an objective Spirit unfolding through time. Yet if Hegel took a step forward beyond Kants isolated subject, his valorization of state-imposed morality (Sittlichkeit) was a step back to Christian monarchism. Only Hegels leftwing successors of the 1830s developed a social theory of language to mediate between subject and object. The Young Hegelian Ludwig Feuerbach located the potential for human freedom not in a transcendent God but in everyday social relations, constituted through language.

For Habermas, modern constitutions create the institutional framework for a participatory public sphere, the heart of democratic life. Citizens are bound only by the force of the better argument and can reach agreement across cultural divides.

Habermas titles his last chapter The Contemporaneity of the Young Hegelians, underscoring an enduring shift in the locus of reason from subjective consciousness to intersubjective communication. He dismisses Karl Marxs critique of ideology, which situated the theorist over the heads of the participants themselves. Instead, Habermas regards Charles Sanders Peirce, the founder of American pragmatism, as the true successor to the Young Hegelians. Peirce developed Feuerbachs philosophy of language into a full-fledged theory of knowledge. For Peirce, scientific knowledge obtained solely in intersubjective understandings. Language was the essential medium coordinating between the external world and the research of the scientific community.

Habermas, finally, draws a line to his own writings. Whereas Peirce uncovered linguistic learning processes in science and technology, Habermass own work since the 1980s has shown how communication fosters progress in moral and political life as well. Habermas elects not to engage the late twentieth-century debates that surrounded his corpus. That, he writes, would have required at least one more book. But this decision only contributes to the air of inevitability surrounding This Too a History of Philosophy. Habermass theory of communicative rationality emerges as the outcome of, and explanation for, the trajectory he has traced since the Axial Age. The learning process, it would seem, culminates in its own self-awarenessrealized in Habermass oeuvre.

This brief summary can hardly do justice to the staggering array of texts and debates that Habermas explores. The architecture of the work is ingenious, if its teleology does not fully convince. Most pressing, however, Habermas intends his History not only as a historical exercise, but as a record of the ideas that have furnished the political foundations of the modern West. The work invites readers to consider the resonancesand contradictionsbetween philosophy and politics.

Habermas himself, as in his previous works, sees a close alignment of the two. The normative implications he draws will not surprise veteran readers. A detranscendentalized concept of rational libertythe result of the three-thousand-year dialogue of faith and knowledgeforms the key to a universalist rational morality that makes possible the discursive resolution of moral conflicts, even with a multiplicity of heterogeneous voices. In turn, the historical traces of those moral-practical learning processes traced over his study are deposited in the practices and legal guarantees of democratic constitutional states. In short, modern constitutions create the institutional framework for a participatory public sphere, the heart of democratic life. Here, citizens are bound only by the force of the better argument and can reach agreement across cultural divides.

A tension persists between Habermass political ideals and his historical framework. His storys European origin collides with its universal intent.

It is an appealing vision. At a time when a global pandemic has only exacerbated spiraling inequalities, pervasive racism, and xenophobic insurgencies on both sides of the Atlantic, Habermas suggests that humanity already possesses the resources for levelheaded debate oriented toward the common good. Yet a tension persists between Habermass political ideals and his historical framework. The gap is not so much one of theory and practice, which Habermas readily acknowledges. Instead, his storys European origin collides with its universal intent. Habermas insists that postmetaphysical reasonbecause it refuses to take refuge in foundational certaintiesprovides a basis for the inter-cultural dialogue necessary to confront global crises of climate change, mass migration, and unregulated markets. But by tracing the emergence of modern rationality solely to a Western, and Christian, learning process, he elides the historical reckoning necessary for any such dialogue.

The same problem faced Habermass Enlightenment precursors, who equally saw Europe as the source of universal ideals. Yet philosophical histories of the German Enlightenment also recognized the role of power in history, and the violence that saturated Europes interactions with the non-European world. Kants 1784 essay Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, which informs Habermass argument for a global public sphere, predicted the achievement of world peace through the improvement in the political constitutions of our continent (which will probably legislate eventually for all other continents). Herder more directly confronted the nexus of European global domination and colonial violence, and suggested that history would have its revenge. Europe must give compensation for the debts that it has incurred, make good the crimes that it has committednot from choice but according to the very nature of things.

Even Hegels history of Absolute Spirit, the most bluntly Eurocentric teleology of classical German Idealism, attests to counter-narratives that shook the self-certainties of revolutionary Europe. As the political theorist Susan Buck-Morss has pointed out, the Haitian Revolution of 17911804, the slave uprising that overthrew French rule over the Caribbean island, may well have motivated Hegels early account of freedom. Though Hegel would later become an apologist for slavery, his dialectical theory of history modeled how political ideals emerge out of struggle, not only consensus. At the same time that Idealist philosophies of history enacted colonialist apologetics, they could also, if inadvertently, subvert them.

This Too a History of Philosophy, by contrast, devotes limited attention to the contradictions of European slavery and colonialism, as well as their problematic treatment by contemporaries. Habermas instead frames colonial encounters as moments in the learning process, way stations on the path toward moral universalism. He addresses the conquest of the Americas only to conclude that Francisco de Vitoria, the sixteenth-century Scholastic who defended the property rights of indigenous peoples, exemplified the universal reach of Catholic natural law. A long section on Lockes theory of natural rights omits their use to justify colonial expropriations.

Haiti, too, is absent from Habermass History, as is the centuries-long, intra-Christian debate over the legitimacy of slavery. Instead, Habermas tells a more straightforward story. The abolition of slavery, he argues, is a popular and really striking example of moral learning:

While the slaves always should have been understood as persons who were denied the social status of free people, the masters first had to learn to recognize and acknowledge in the Other the same person that they were in themselves.

But this description is misleading. It elides not only slaverys enduring legacies, but the histories of resistance, civil war, and violent backlash that paved the twisted road to emancipation. And these histories can hardly be decoupled from the emergence of human rights. Habermas takes the enactment of democratic constitutions to mark the historical embodiment of reason, but the North Atlantic constitutions of the Age of Revolution continued to authorize slavery at the same time that they expanded the rights of privileged groups.

Habermas proceeds similarly through nineteenth- and twentieth-century social reform, passing over the contested, politicized, and still ongoing struggles by which marginalized groups claimed legal rights. Like the abolition of slavery, Habermas regards the authorization of religious tolerance, freedom of opinion, [and] sexual equality, increasingly also the recognition of sexual freedom as the results of moral learning processes. Such learning occurs when

relevant parts of the population discover new connections to other people, toward whom until then they had felt little or only weak obligation . . . allowing them to understand that even these strangers are in no relevant manner different from themselves.

Habermas does not further specify who stands on each side of these learning processes, the active bestowers of rights and the receptive strangers. The implication, however, is that extensions of rights tend to proceed from the moral learning of societys dominant groups.

Habermass account of Western moral progress not only stands apart from classics of critical theory like Horkheimer and Adornos Dialectic of Enlightenment. It is also, arguably, in tension with his own earlier work on the public sphere. In an essay for Habermass ninetieth birthday, the philosopher Mara Pa Lara underscores how Habermass concept of publicity provides tools for feminists and other excluded groups to challenge power structures and demand recognition as political subjects. Yet stories of excluded groups and individuals who inserted themselves into the public sphereand the canon of Western philosophyare all but absent from This Too a History of Philosophy. For its many twists and turns, the history Habermas tells is linear and aggregative, the unfolding of an immanent logic. Rarely do we learn of realizations that were unjustly discarded, knowledge suppressed, experiments failed. In the learning process, it would seem, little is forgotten.

Habermas might object that such a critique misses the point. Painful histories of slavery and colonialism are not at issue, since Western political thought has still come to hold the abolition of racism (or sexism, religious discrimination, or homophobia) as a normative ideal to orient action. And to challenge Habermass conception of the learning process might appear to forfeit the Enlightenment promise of the rational improvement of the human condition.

By tracing the emergence of modern rationality solely to a Western, and Christian, learning process, he elides the historical reckoning necessary for inter-cultural dialogue.

To raise questions of historical accuracy, however, is not to reject Habermass ideals. His goalsconstitutional democracy buttressed by a robust public sphere, equal rights realized in both law and practice, and international cooperation around global problemsremain critically important, even as their attainment appears ever more remote. But a history oriented toward the realization of these ideals would require fuller examination of the contexts under which they were formed and contested. To narrow the genesis of moral universalism to a Western, Christian learning process limits our understanding of how political change happened in the past. Transforming the contingent into the inexorable, such a narrative constricts social theorys thinking of possible futures.

Habermas draws to a close with a reference to Theodor Adornos late essay, Reason and Revelation. Reflecting upon on the modern revival of irrational faiths, Adorno concluded that a return to religion could not be sustained. Nothing of theological content will persist without being transformed, Adorno pronounced. Every content will have to put itself to the test of migrating into the realm of the secular, the profane.

Adorno wrote these words in homage to his friend and interlocutor Walter Benjamin, who committed suicide in 1940 fleeing Nazi persecution at the French-Spanish border. Its inclusion is a fitting tribute to Adorno, Habermass teacher and the thinker who articulated the crisis of modern civilization to which Habermass career has responded. And Habermas answers Adorno in a manner fitting of Benjamin, whose late writings perceived the glimmer of messianic hope peering through histories of suffering:

So long as religious experience can still support, on the basis of ritual praxis, the presence of a strong transcendence . . . the question remains open for secular reason whether there are uncompensated semantic contents that still await a translation into the profane.

Religion, Habermas suggests, might retain a sacral core that resists secularization.

Yet Habermass concluding reflection is also jarring, underscoring his departure from the Frankfurt Schools first generation. For Adorno and Benjamin, the experience of brute suffering, epitomized in their own time with the rise of National Socialism, revealed the falsehood of progressive teleologies of human reason. Habermas, by contrast, alludes only once to the historical conditions of his predecessors thought, at the end of a long introduction. Regression, he notes, remains the constant shadow of progress:

What we experienced in the twentieth century as a true break in civilization is anything other than a relapse into barbarism, but the absolutely new, and from now on always present possibility of the moral collapse of an entire nation.

Habermas goes on to concede that unreason in history will be a neglected theme in what is to follow. The Nazi period does not reappear.

Set in the context of German history, an implicit premise of Habermass work may well be that the Federal Republic of Germanys democratic transformation, what Habermas earlier termed its unconditional opening toward the West, vindicates the long arc of the learning process. The unreason that preoccupied his forebears, Habermas seems to suggest, should not blind us to the Wests historical achievements. Habermas has been rightly lauded for seeking a way forward beyond his precursors totalizing critique of reason. His own public contributions proved vital to fostering democratic culture in postwar Germany. But Habermass History avoids linking the emergence of Western-cum-universal rationality with systems of violence and dispossession whose legacies are all too visible todayand that also shaped the history of philosophy.

The unreason that preoccupied his forebears, Habermas seems to suggest, should not blind us to the Wests historical achievements.

Still, by any measure, This Too a History of Philosophy is a landmark achievement. The text caps a generative intellectual career, clarifying how Habermas understands the historical and conceptual foundations of his lifelong project. Most significantly, the work will inspire the next cohort of critical theorists to confront anew the problem of philosophys historical ground. Challenges to democracy and struggles for justice in our own moment may belie the conviction that public reason is the sole heritage of the West, or the apex of its historical progress. But thinking with and against Habermas offers powerful tools for reconsidering the place of communicative action in social theory's project of emancipation. Returning to history as a critical lens on the discourse of philosophy, rather than the canvas of its rational development, offers one path forward.

Authors Note: The author would like to thank Liat Spiro for many conversations about the questions treated in this essay.

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The Unfinished Project of Enlightenment - Boston Review

Jewish cemetery in Poland vandalized with spray-paint – Forward

Posted By on June 18, 2020

Image by Emmanuel Dyan/Flickr

A grave at the Jewish cemetery in Tarnow, Poland.

WARSAW, Poland (JTA) A wall of the Jewish cemetery in Tarnow, a city in southern Poland, was spray-painted with the letters AJ, likely meaning Anti-Jude, or anti-Jewish.

The walls Star of David was painted over as well. Police are investigating; there are no suspects.

According to the cemetery keeper, Adam Bartosz, because the wall is brick, removing the spray-paint will not be easy, and scraping the paint will leave traces.

Maybe well leave it as a testimony of stupidity, said Bartosz, who was quoted by Krakow Radio.

Tarnow Mayor Roman Ciepiela condemned the act and posted on Facebook that town residents should do everything to make the language of violence and contempt for others disappear once and for all from Tarnows public space. Tarnow, which is about 45 miles from Krakow, has a population of over 100,000.

Last July, the cemetery was vandalized just after an $800,000 renovation.

Established in 1581, the cemetery was added to the registry of protected monuments in 1976.

Before World War II, about 25,000 Jews lived in Tarnow. Most were murdered in the Belzec and Auschwitz concentration camps.

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Jewish American Heritage Month | National Archives

Posted By on June 18, 2020

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Singer Eddie Cantor (center) sits next to former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt at a dinner of the Massachusetts Committee of Catholics, Protestants, and Jews in Boston, MA, May 25, 1950. Also seated (left to right): Frank Leahy and Paul Devers. (National Archives Identifier 196768)

The Triangle Shirtwaist Fire of March 25, 1911, claimed 146 lives, mostly recently immigrated Jewish women. A march on April 5, 1911, attracted thousands of women calling for safer working conditions and union representation. (National Archives Identifier5730933)

Rabbi Stephen S. Wiseof the Free Synagogue in New Yorkand his18-year-old son became laborers in the shipbuilding yards of the Luders Marine Construction Company, at Stamford, CT, during World War I. (National Archives Identifier 533712)

Songwriter Irving Berlin (center) shakes the hand of Bob Hope ata White House Dinner held in honor of returning Vietnam prisoners of war, May 24, 1974. Also on stage are President Richard Nixon, Vic Damone,Sammy Davis, Jr., and First Lady Patricia Nixon. (National Archives Identifier 7268213)

Senator Joseph Lieberman (right), withGovernor of Connecticut Dan Patrick Malloyand Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, listens to reports from Federal, state and local officials following Hurricane Sandy. November 1, 2012.(Photo by Holly Stephens/FEMA,National Archives Identifier24470016)

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Jewish American Heritage Month | National Archives

De Blasio, Cuomo are making children bear the worst of the lockdowns – New York Post

Posted By on June 18, 2020

Videos circulating on social media recently show New York City Parks employees welding shut a playground in the heart of Hasidic Williamsburg, Brooklyn. We have seen footage of the New York Police Department and NYC Parks Police in Boro Park shepherding Hasidic children out of a park and locking it shut behind them.

Meanwhile, tens of thousands are allowed to protest in Brooklyn, while a maskless Mayor Bill de Blasio poses for photo-ops, ignoring the social-distancing guidelines his administration ruthlessly enforces against Jewish children and families.

The hypocrisy is stunning and appalling.

Is it too much to ask for consistent leadership in the Big Apple? Is it too much to ask that our mayor enforce policies equally, across the board? Is it too much to ask that the mayor practice what he preaches or even set an example, instead of scurrying after the most popular position of the week, gung-ho about lockdowns two weeks ago and gung-ho about mass protests today?

And why are our children becoming the victims of this whiplash-inducing virtue-signaling?

If it were only the mayor taking dumb stances, perhaps we could chalk it up to de Blasio being de Blasio. But Gov. Andrew Cuomo isnt exactly the beacon of leadership that he projected at the outset of this crisis. On Friday, he took the confounding step of banning sleepaway camps in New York state this summer.

Sleepaway camps: an enclosed campus where kids could be easily monitored and contained. Where city kids could go to get fresh air, run around and see their friends. (After all, they cant go to the playground!)

So when New York City begins Phase Two at the end of June, a parent will be able to go to his office job, get a haircut at his local barbershop, then visit a clothing store to pick up a new pair of pants. But a child, who has been cooped up alone at home since March can he go to camp or even the playground down the block? Heaven forfend!

And before you tell me that day camps are permitted to be open, yes, thats true. But many have shut their doors owing to financial insecurity. And because of limiting guidelines, the ones that are remaining open cant possibly sustain the thousands of children who are suddenly left with no plans for the summer.

When we enter Phase Three in July, as kids are still sitting at home twiddling their thumbs, adults will be permitted to dine inside restaurants, visit a spa and work out at the gym. And at the end of July, as kids become permanently fused to the sofa, their parents can take in Broadway shows or perhaps even attend concerts.

By the way, how are parents supposed to be able to rejoin the workforce and get our city back up and running if theyve got children at home all day with nowhere to go?

And can someone point out to me the date when we anointed Cuomo emperor of New York State, and de Blasio king of New York City? Last time I checked, we lived in a democracy. The state of emergency has passed the curve is flattened. Why are we still permitting elected leaders to unilaterally make decisions, with no input from legislators and stakeholders?

They serve us, the people. We arent subject to their whims, and our children dont deserve to be pawns in this strange tug of war.

Our kids have suffered tremendously from this COVID-19 shutdown. Theyve missed out on so much, and theyve lost out on experiences that can never be regained.

And you know what, as parents, we were willing to keep our kids at home to protect them, and to protect the people whom they would otherwise come in contact with. It was hard, but we did because it was the right thing to do. That was three months ago.

New York Citys kids have been through enough. Let us not be so heartless as to take away their summer, too.

Chaim Deutsch is a New York City councilman and a candidate for the US Congress in the Ninth District.

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De Blasio, Cuomo are making children bear the worst of the lockdowns - New York Post

Jewish American Heritage Month 2020 – EMET | Endowment for …

Posted By on June 17, 2020

EMET is grateful to Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism Elan Carr, who emphasized on our April 23rd webinar the importance of celebrating Jewish American Heritage Month (JAHM). In a recent poll, the ADL found that over half (54%) of Jews in America have either experienced or witnessed some form of antisemitism in the past five years.

In 2006, President George W. Bush declared the month of May as JAHM, and it has been observed ever since. Special Envoy Carr educated us on the importance of practicing Philo-Semitism as a critical tool in battle against antisemitism. President Donald J. Trump ensured the continuance of this tradition and called upon Americans to celebrate the heritage and contributions of American Jews and to observe this month with appropriate programs, activities, and ceremonies.

In order to do just that, during the month of May EMET will be highlighting Jewish Americans throughout our national history who have contributed extraordinarily to The United States of America in a wide variety of fields. We hope you will enjoy celebrating JAHM 2020 with EMET, and encourage you to share the celebration and hashtags (#PhiloSemitismand#JAHM2020) with others as well!

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Jewish American Heritage Month 2020 - EMET | Endowment for ...

Dutch-Jewish WWII hero who saved hundreds of children dies at 96 – Forward

Posted By on June 17, 2020

Image by Twitter/jckamsterdam

Betty Goudsmit-Oudkerk

AMSTERDAM (JTA) Betty Goudsmit-Oudkerk, a Dutch-Jewish woman who saved hundreds of Jewish children from the Holocaust, has died at the age of 96.

Goudsmit-Oudkerk, who died Sunday, was the last living member of the small team of rescuers who smuggled Jewish children to safety over several months from a Protestant religious seminary in Amsterdam, the Dutch Het Parool daily reported.

The seminary, which was run by the late Johan van Hulst, bordered on an internment facility that the Nazis set up for Jewish children opposite the Hollandsche Schouwburg concentration facility where their parents had been kept. At 17, Goudsmit-Oudkerk was allowed to care for the jailed children. With help from the director of the Hollandsche Schouwburg, Walter Sskind, she helped transfer hundreds of children to van Hulst and his team.

Goudsmit-Oudkerk had for decades declined to speak publicly over her role in the rescue operation. She finally agreed to be interviewed for a book about her several years ago. The Dutch-language book was published in 2016 and is titled Betty: A Jewish childrens caretaker in the Resistance.

The former seminary and the Hollandsche Schouwburg are now part of the Jewish Cultural Quarter of Amsterdam, a group of several Jewish heritage sites. In 2022, a $27 million Holocaust museum is scheduled to open in the building that housed the seminary.

Emile Schrijver, the director of the Jewish Cultural Quarter, conveyed his condolences to Goudsmit-Oudkerks family in a statement, calling her a true hero.

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Orthodox Jews, Catholic priests sue NY over worship restrictions – Forward

Posted By on June 17, 2020

Image by Getty Images

Hasidic men and women walk through a Jewish Orthodox neighborhood in Brooklyn on April 24, 2017 in New York City.

(JTA) Three Orthodox Jews from Brooklyn and two Catholic priests are suing New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo and other New York officials over continued restrictions on houses of worship due to the coronavirus pandemic.

The lawsuit, filed Wednesday, also names New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio and state Attorney General Letitia James as defendants. It accuses Cuomo of violating the plaintiffs rights to free exercise of religion and speech by limiting the number of people who can attend religious services, a move Cuomo made in mid-March to slow the spread of disease in New York.

Earlier this month, Cuomoissued an executive order permitting houses of worship to open, at 25% capacity, in areas designated as phase two of the state reopening plan, which includes all of the state except for New York City. Houses of worship had been slated for the fourth stage of reopening.

The Orthodox Jewish plaintiffs Elchanan Perr, Daniel Schonborn and Mayer Mayerfeld live in Brooklyn, where houses of worship are currently capped at just 10 attendees.

The three men joined with two Catholic priests to challenge the emergency orders. These orders, both the emergency stay-at-home and reopening plan declarations, clearly discriminate against houses of worship, Christopher Ferrara, special council for the Thomas More Society, which is representing the plaintiffs,said in a statement.

Why is a large worship gathering deemed more dangerous than a mass protest, full of shouting, arm-waving people in close proximity to one another? he added, referring to the protests in New York and across the country in the wake of the death of George Floyd in police custody in Minneapolis.

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Understanding the dress codes of Orthodox Jewish women and their diverse interpretations – CNN

Posted By on June 17, 2020

Written by Hannah Tindle, CNN

Based on the true story of Deborah Feldman, a Jewish woman who left the Satmar community in Williamsburg, Brooklyn in search of a new life, the hit Netflix series "Unorthodox" has brought Hasidic culture -- and its female dress codes -- into mainstream focus. One of the most talked about aspects of the show is the clothing, which shapes lead character Esty's (played by Shira Haas) story from beginning to end.

The show's costume designer Justine Seymour spent hours on meticulous research, including a week-long stint within the Satmar community in New York. "I consider one of the biggest gifts of my job to be that it is very creative, but also very educational," she said during a phone interview.

"You do have to be sensitive, respectful, and informed when you are observing a very closed community," said Seymour, who is not Jewish. She said she discovered that the women she met during her research embraced designer brands for shoes, headscarves and handbags. "Kate Spade, Chanel, Ferragamo and Hermes were the stand-out designers," she said, that "add a bit of glamour to the conservative dress code."

Whether scouring second-hand stores for silk scarves (she said she purchased over 100 for the show) or building faux-fur shtreimels (hats worn by married Hasidic men usually made from mink) from scratch, Seymour said she worked hard to ensure that each costume would adhere to Orthodox Jewish laws, but also celebrate the nuances of individual style.

Esty on her wedding day in "Unorthodox." Credit: Anika Molnar/Netflix

Orthodox dressing can often be perceived by outsiders as overly restrictive, and as leaving little room for individual freedom and self-expression. Feldman and the fictional character of Esty both struggled with the pressures put on them by their communities, which extended to their appearance, but all three of the Jewish women interviewed for this article felt that there's more freedom to explore one's personal style than people might assume -- particularly within less conservative households or branches -- and many devout women do play with fashion to reflect their personal taste, while staying within the religious dress codes they have chosen to follow.

Orthodox Judaism encompasses many traditions and customs, with the Hasidim of Williamsburg being just one ultra-observant group. And while women living in this particular community tend to subscribe to more stringent rules for getting dressed, modern Orthodox followers, for example, choose to interpret some of the core principles differently.

Specific style codes vary from community to community, with clothing often dictated by practicality or religious occasion -- Shabbat, Yom Tov (meaning holiday), weddings and bar mitzvahs -- as much as personal taste. But no matter where you are or whatever the occasion, in the Orthodox Jewish world, what to wear is governed by the concept of modesty, called tzniut in Hebrew and tznius in Yiddish. From Tel Aviv to Massachusetts, it is with tznius in mind that clothing is chosen.

Tamara Fulton, a fashion stylist and lifestyle editor, who is married to an Orthodox rabbi and lives in London, explained: "There are lots of different Jewish communities all over the world with much diversity yet the underlying principles they share are the same. Tznius is the word in Judaism that is slightly mistranslated to mean simply 'modesty,' but it's not just about modest dressing. Tznius applies to both men and women, and is based upon the concept of humility. It's really about how you are in the world, and how you carry yourself in a reserved but dignified manner," said Fulton.

This usually means the following for Orthodox women: trousers are not worn, and skirts and dresses must fall below the knee, including when sitting; arms are covered to the elbow, and necklines are high-cut. Often clothing is altered -- with slits in skirts sewn up and false necklines added. Layering is also often used to create final looks.

The scene from "Unorthodox" when Esty's hair is shaved. Credit: Anika Molnar/Netflix

Once married, covering your hair is another one of the key principles of tznius. Not all women will shave their real hair, as Esty does during one of the most memorable scenes of "Unorthodox" (her hair is in fact shaved for her). But many observant women will either wear a scarf or a sheitel, the Yiddish word for wig.

A Jewish teacher who taught in Israel in a girls' seminary and also lived in the Haredi, or ultra-Orthodox, community in Manchester in the north of England agreed to be interviewed for this article, but asked not to be named for reasons of modesty.

She wears a sheitel herself and explained that they can often be used as an accessory or as a way to change up your look. Over the phone she said: "One (woman) I know has a selection of all different color sheitels in different styles. Because she says: 'I'm covering my head and I'm thinking of a sheitel as a hat. So if I want to be blonde one day and brunette another, why shouldn't I be?'"

The style of sheitel is also dependent on the community. For example, some Hasidic women wear shorter wigs with a hat on top, so there is no doubt they are wearing a head covering. Sheitels are made from both human and synthetic hair. When she was living in Manchester, the teacher always preferred to wear her wig made from real hair for special occasions. "I would have real hair for Shabbat, and then synthetic for every day," she said.

Wearing gifted jewelry on Shabbat or special occasions is also common. "It is believed that married women should be given beautiful jewelry," said the teacher. "It might be modest, but it would be of high quality."

Seymour noted that jewelry was an important component when assembling the costumes for "Unorthodox." She remembered having to dress around 60 women for Esty and her husband Yanky's wedding scene, all in replica diamonds and pearls. Later in this scene, the groom presents his new bride with a pair of latticed diamond earrings. "They are very close to the earrings Deborah Feldman was given in reality," she said.

When is comes to color, like with other cultures and religions, different colors take on different meanings, but black isn't the only color worn by Hasidic women. "When I lived in Israel, we hardly wore black," said the teacher. "It was very bright colors. But not red -- never red! As this color is not seen as modest. (In Hasidic communities) women will tend to wear navy, bottle green, browns and gray."

"For all women, the clothes are an expression of yourself. The idea is to look smart, but not to draw too much attention to yourself," she explained.

A look from the Erdem show at London Fashion Week in February. Credit: Stuart Wilson/BFC/Getty Images

Orthodox women choose to buy clothing from a variety of different places -- from Jewish-owned clothing stores within their community to other non-Jewish shops or shopping centers. For Fulton, there are several go-to stores that often sell pieces that work for her. "I prefer to wear clothes that are designed to be worn as they are, rather than layering or altering for modesty," she said. "H&M and Zara are great for this."

She also noted that many high fashion designers have been producing collections that offer options for women who choose to dress modestly. "It's really interesting to see designers like Valentino, Erdem, and McQueen, for example, produce styles that just happen to be appropriate for women who might want to dress in a more modest way. I'm a big fan of the whole 1970s revival, too, with Laura Ashley-inspired designs and brands such as The Vampire's Wife."

Another brand that has become popular with both observant and secular women alike is Batsheva. The 2018 CFDA/Vogue Fashion Fund winning brand is known for its ruffled, prairie-style dresses. Established by native New Yorker Batsheva Hay, the foundations of her namesake label are centered around her own personal history and culture.

Her husband, photographer Alexei Hay, began following Orthodox practices just before they started dating. At their wedding, Batsheva -- who grew up in a secular Jewish family and who is not ultra-observant of Jewish dress codes -- said men and women were separated, which is traditional, and Hay wore her mother's wedding dress, made from Mexican lace and suitable for tznius.

Alexei and Batsheva Hay on their wedding day. Credit: Courtesy of Batsheva Hay

With no formal fashion design training, Hay -- a former lawyer -- first started making clothes for herself while at home raising young children. She launched her brand in 2016.

"When I was starting Batsheva, I was finding that so many of the references that I was interested in were retro or old-fashioned," she said over the phone. "Also in my (neighborhood), and in Brooklyn which is a quick subway ride away from me, I was seeing Orthodox women who dressed similarly to this." Hay, who said she is compelled by working within specific, pre-laid rules, but interpreting them anew. In this way, she has developed a style that is modest but also distinctive and fun.

A look from the Batsheva Spring-Summer 2020 collection presented at New York Fashion Week in September 2019 Credit: Victor Virgile/Gamma-Rapho/Getty Images

"The goal for Orthodox Jews is not an abandonment of beauty," she said. "It's supposed to be working within that to still look beautiful."

Seymour echoed this sentiment: "With the costumes in 'Unorthodox,' I wanted to honor women all over the world who want to look beautiful without breaking the codes of modesty." She said she was struck by the pride many of the woman in the Satmar community took in dressing well. "If the show can inspire a little bit more glamour and beauty, and pride in the way (all women) dress, I would be overjoyed."

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Understanding the dress codes of Orthodox Jewish women and their diverse interpretations - CNN

What Hasidim can teach everyone about staying safe on the Internet – Forward

Posted By on June 17, 2020

Last year, the journalist Kevin Roose wrote about Caleb Cain, a young, white, twenty-something man who came to sympathize with the alt-right (and then abandon them) simply by watching YouTube videos. Cains journey was largely shaped by YouTubes algorithm, which responded to his viewership by recommending increasingly right-wing content. Roose, who has spent years exploring YouTubes inner workings, has argued that this algorithm has been an incredible boon to conspiracy theorists and extremists of all types, since it is designed to increase overall viewership by pushing people from popular content towards increasingly fringe offerings. Similar algorithmic complaints have been lodged against Facebook.

By now, the internets ability to drive people towards extreme positions has been well documented. In extreme cases, the internet can even lead people to violence. ISIS used the internet as a major recruiting tool, and it is now common for mass shooters including the one who killed 11 people at the Tree of Life synagogueto have affiliations with online communities that promote anti-Semitism, white supremacy and neo-Nazism. Even as the internet has proven more crucial than ever to connect people during the pandemic, its angrier corners continue to flourish.

Are there ways to mitigate the danger of the internet? Yes, but not many. Whereas China and other authoritarian regimes actively censor the internet, America largely does not, and online forums are protected from liability through both the First Amendment and safe harbor regulations. Parents, too, can theoretically control their childrens internet access, but these controls are often easy to circumvent and self control, as you might expect, is often a non-starter.

In practice, then, the power to control behavior and content online lies almost entirely with large technology firms, and the track record of these firms is decidedly mixed. YouTube has tweaked its algorithm, Twitter has ejected users, and Reddit has shut down numerous toxic forums. But when firms choose not to act, there is little anyone can do to force their hands. Mark Zuckerberg has continued to resist calls for fact-checking Facebook content. Forums that actively promote hate speech have been driven off the internet repeatedly, only to reemerge a short while later. Toxic content and conspiracy theories remain readily accessible for anyone who cares to look. This is not likely to change any time soon.

So what is there to do? Ironically, our societal anxiety that the internet pulls communities apart is shared by many ultra-Orthodox communities, even those that ostensibly dont use the internet at all. While their blanket rejection of the internet is sometimes met with scorn, even among other Jews, these communities basic concern that time on the internet will loosen commitments to shared values and shared beliefs is widely shared by Americans. But whereas most Americans see the internets problems as largely out of their personal control, ultra-Orthodox communities have for decades taken active measures to limit access to online content and forums and have used social pressure to enforce this self-regulation. This communal enforcement of online spaces is detailed extensively in Ayala Faders new book, Hidden Heretics.

Faders new book is about ultra-Orthodox Jews who publicly conform to community expectations while privately reading forbidden literature, watching movies, positing heretical ideas, or breaking any number of Jewish laws. All of this happens secretly so secretly, in fact, that their own children might not know. Fader, an anthropologist, hides many personal details about her subjects in order to protect their identities. Nonetheless, her analysis is both substantial and riveting. One chapter delves into the complex relationships between double-lifers and their children and spouses; another covers the pathologization of religious doubt, and another looks at how men and women differ in their use of secret communities and how their rebellions are viewed by the larger Hasidic community. Throughout the book, Fader, whose previous study looked at the lives of Hasidic girls, exhibits a remarkable ability to empathize with her subjects while withholding judgment about both the morality of their activities and their communities disapproval. Ultimately, the double-lifers are depicted as symptomatic of tectonic shifts in communal authority that are currently underway.

Hidden Heretics isnt entirely about the internet, but the communities it discusses could not exist without it. Since the heyday of blogging in the mid-2000s, the internet has been a uniquely powerful avenue for expressing criticism and validating doubts about communal power structures, social expectations and basic beliefs. With the advent of Facebook, and later WhatsApp, many of these conversations have migrated from the comments sections of websites to closed discussion groups.

None of this has been lost on authorities within yeshivish and Hasidic communities, who have increasingly labeled the internet as a major threat to their way of life. Whereas early criticism of the internet primarily focused on pornography, contemporary anti-internet rhetoric has also portrayed it as a source of dangerous ideas that have the power to destroy families. These concerns were most publicly addressed in the 2012 Asifa, in which tens of thousands of men packed Citi Field (and thousands of women watched remotely) to rally against the internet.

This just say no approach is more than just an ideal. Over the last decade, ultra-Orthodox communities have developed formal policies, software, and hardware, all designed to disentangle necessary streams of communication from the wider internet. The development of these tools is a growing business that has become an avenue of employment for some Hasidic men, and interest in the software is high enough to support multiple competing filters; Fader reports that the two sects of Satmar Hasidim differ in their choice of censorship software. While these tools are theoretically self-policing, schools have exerted pressure on parents to install this software, sometimes even threatening expulsion if a specific brand of filtering software is not installed.

This control has been very effective. Fader describes one young man who began donating blood on a weekly basis because the clinic was the only setting in his life that contained a television. Double-lifers, whose communities can only exist through clandestine violations of communal norms, will sometimes call themselves marranos, a reference to those Jews who secretly practiced Judaism under the ever-present fear of the Inquisition and given the very real social consequences that face these double-lifers were they discovered, it is easy to understand why the comparison resonates.

But this is the part of the story where my feelings become more complicated because, as it turns out, many of the ultra-Orthodox communities concerns about the internet are shared by just about everybody. One piece of anti-smartphone propaganda, which depicts a group of people bowing to a phone topped with a crown, expresses a concern about addictive technology that is familiar to anyone who uses these devices. Ultra-Orthodox communities are aware that some of their concerns are not unique; Fader describes one anti-internet event in which a speaker cited the journalist Nicholas Carr, who has written extensively about how the internet changes our brains.

Ultra-Orthodox communities are regularly critiqued for the way in which they restrict access to knowledge online; a scene in Netflixs Unorthodox, for example, depicts the main character totally flummoxed by a computer. The problem is that this critique conflates the information being barred with the platform on which that information is located. While there is certainly disagreement about what ideas are healthy for consumption, there is in fact a great deal of agreement about the problems of the platform itself. A Hasidic father worried about his son falling into atheism and a secular father worried about his son taking the red pill and becoming a misogynist are fundamentally worried about the internet for exactly the same reason. The difference is that one family relies on the decency of technology firms to limit access to toxic ideas, while the other has the backing of well-established communal norms.

The ultra-Orthodox response to the internet is neither workable nor desirable for most Americans, but the type of response that is, a check on the internet that comes from communities, rather than corporations or governments flexes a muscle that many communities, especially religious communities, have forgotten they possess. If the internet is a cesspool because the companies that manage it arent good enough at taking out the trash, communities can and should make it their business to set norms around healthy and unhealthy forms of internet use, help members identify toxic online environments, and even help them curtail overall use of their devices. If they are sufficiently large, communities can even lobby tech companies on their members behalf.

In emulating ultra-Orthodox methods, new possibilities for regulation will undoubtedly emerge. Because it is viewed as inherently dangerous, Ultra-Orthodox regulation of the internet is almost entirely about censorship and limiting access, an attitude that inevitably invites rebellion. Communities that see the internet as inherently valuable, however, need not stick to these blunt instruments of control; in fact, the more interesting work is in creating a positive vision for how the internet should look. Just as religious norms about behavior in the real world consist of much more than a list of places youre not supposed to go, religious norms about the virtual world needs to consist of more than just a list of blacklisted websites.

Religious leaders are not always the most technologically sophisticated; many simply dont have the ability to parse the various forms of internet culture and think about how to use them in a healthy manner, and so they often act as though criticizing online behavior is like pushing against the tide. But, as Faders description of the ultra-Orthodox world shows, religions can set norms around online behavior just as easily as they can around behavior in the real world. In reality, the radical indifference of so many religious communities towards regulating internet usage is far more exceptional than Hasidic condemnation. More religious communities should consider stepping up.

David Zvi Kalman is a Fellow in Residence at the Shalom Hartman Institute of North America and the founder of an independent Jewish publishing house. He won a 2018 first-place Rockower Award for his Forward story The insanely fascinating history of Hanukkah light.

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